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Can preventive care activities in general
practice be sustained when financial
incentives and external audit plus feedback
are removed? ACCEPt-able: a cluster
randomised controlled trial protocol
Jane S. Hocking1*, Meredith Temple-Smith2, Mieke van Driel3, Matthew Law4, Rebecca Guy4, Liliana Bulfone5,
Anna Wood1, Nicola Low6, Basil Donovan4, Christopher K. Fairley7, John Kaldor and Jane Gunn2
Abstract
Background: Financial incentives and audit plus feedback on performance are two strategies commonly used by
governments to motivate general practitioners (GP) to undertake specific healthcare activities. However, in recent
years, governments have reduced or removed incentive payments without evidence of the potential impact on GP
behaviour and patient outcomes. This trial (known as ACCEPt-able) aims to determine whether preventive care activities
in general practice are sustained when financial incentives and/or external audit plus feedback on preventive
care activities are removed. The activity investigated is annual chlamydia testing for 16- to 29-year-old adults,
a key preventive health strategy within this age group.
Methods/design: ACCEPt-able builds on a large cluster randomised controlled trial (RCT) that evaluated a 3-year
chlamydia testing intervention in general practice. GPs were provided with a support package to facilitate annual
chlamydia testing of all sexually active 16- to 29-year-old patients. This package included financial incentive payments
to the GP for each chlamydia test conducted and external audit plus feedback on each GP’s chlamydia testing rates.
ACCEPt-able is a factorial cluster RCT in which general practices are randomised to one of four groups: (i) removal of
audit plus feedback—continue to receive financial incentive payments for each chlamydia test; (ii) removal of financial
incentive payments—continue to receive audit plus feedback; (iii) removal of financial incentive payments and audit
plus feedback; and (iv) continue financial incentive payments and audit plus feedback. The primary outcome is
chlamydia testing rate measured as the proportion of sexually active 16- to 29-year-olds who have a GP consultation
within a 12-month period and at least one chlamydia test.
Discussion: This will be the first RCT to examine the impact of removal of financial incentive payments and audit plus
feedback on the chlamydia testing behaviour of GPs. This trial is particularly timely and will increase our understanding
about the impact of financial incentives and audit plus feedback on GP behaviour when governments are looking for
opportunities to control healthcare budgets and maximise clinical outcomes for money spent. The results of this trial
will have implications for supporting preventive health measures beyond the content area of chlamydia.
(Continued on next page)
* Correspondence: jhocking@unimelb.edu.au
1Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, University of
Melbourne, 3/207 Bouverie Street, Carlton 3053, VIC, Australia
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Hocking et al. Implementation Science  (2016) 11:122 
DOI 10.1186/s13012-016-0489-0
(Continued from previous page)
Trial registration: The trial has been registered on the Australian and New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry
(ACTRN12614000595617).
Keywords: Financial incentives, Audit and feedback, Cluster randomised controlled trial, Primary care, Preventive care
Background
Primary health care plays a pivotal role in preventive
health, and many different strategies have been employed
to support healthcare professionals to undertake prevent-
ive health activities with their patients. Financial incentives
and audit plus feedback on performance are two common
strategies, used with varying levels of success [1]. Financial
incentives have been a popular approach to increase effi-
ciency in health care, and pay for performance schemes
(P4P) have been widely implemented throughout the
United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK),
Canada and Australia [2, 3]. In P4P, healthcare providers
receive explicit financial incentives based on their per-
formance related to preventive activities undertaken, clin-
ical quality, resource use and patient-reported outcomes.
Audit and feedback is another intervention widely used to
improve professional practice and is part of ongoing pro-
fessional development programmes for general practi-
tioners (GPs) in Australia, the UK and elsewhere [4–6].
In Australia, GPs are the point of entry to primary
healthcare services with over 85 % of Australians attend-
ing general practice each year [7]. The healthcare system
in the UK is similar, and financial incentives are used in
both countries to promote evidence-based practice and
encourage a greater output of health prevention activities.
In Australia, financial incentives in primary care are pro-
vided through the Practice Incentives Program (PIP)
which was introduced in 1998 [8]. Financial incentives are
paid to the general practice for 11 activities and include
incentives for quality prescribing, early diagnosis and ef-
fective management of diabetes and continuing care for
patients with asthma [9]. Within the PIP framework, the
Service Incentives Payment (SIP), introduced in 2001, pro-
vides the possibility for additional payments made directly
to GPs for completing “cycles of care” for patients with
diabetes and asthma and also for conducting cervical
screening of under-screened women. At $AU 282 million
per year, this financial incentive payment scheme is a sig-
nificant cost to the Australian government [10]. In the
UK, the quality and outcomes framework (QOF) was in-
troduced in 2004 and is arguably the most comprehensive
national primary care P4P scheme in the world [11, 12].
UK general practice is remunerated according to perform-
ance against different indicators including clinical care
(e.g. diabetes), organisational issues (e.g. management of
medicines and summarisation of patients’ records) and
patients’ experiences [12, 13]. This UK scheme costs over
£1 billion per year to administer [14].
Audit and feedback is another intervention widely used
to improve professional practice and is part of ongoing
professional development programmes for GPs in
Australia, UK and elsewhere [4, 5, 15, 16]. In an audit plus
feedback process, an individual’s professional practice is
measured and then compared to professional standards or
targets and/or their peers. The results are then given back
to the individual. The expectation is that healthcare pro-
fessionals are prompted to modify their practice if given
feedback that their clinical practice was inconsistent with
that of their peers or accepted guidelines.
In an effort to reduce health budgets, recent changes
have seen a reduction in PIP payments in Australia.
Incentives for childhood immunisation and after-hours
care availability items have been removed, and the
threshold targets for payment eligibility have been in-
creased for the cervical cancer screening and diabetes
management indicators [9]. In the UK, there have also
been changes to the QOF with further increases in the
threshold targets for payment eligibility leading to re-
duced GP income [17]. By building on an existing trial
of a chlamydia testing intervention in general practice
(the Australian Chlamydia Control Effectiveness Pilot
[ACCEPt]), we have the unique opportunity to provide
the first randomised controlled trial (RCT) evidence
about the impact of removing financial incentives and
audit and feedback on the preventive healthcare activ-
ities of GPs in Australia. ACCEPt included financial in-
centive payments per chlamydia test ordered and audit
and feedback on chlamydia testing performance for each
GP in the intervention arm of this 3-year chlamydia test-
ing trial. We will re-randomise intervention general
practices at the conclusion of ACCEPt to investigate the
impact of removing financial incentive payments and/or
audit plus feedback on GPs’ chlamydia testing rates, a
key preventive healthcare activity for young adults
[18–20]. This new trial, referred to as ACCEPt-able,
is described below.
Aims and objectives
ACCEPt-able aims to determine whether preventive care
activities in general practice are sustained when financial
incentive payments and/or external audit plus feedback
on preventive care activities are removed.
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The trial objectives are
1. To investigate the impact of removing financial
incentives on preventive care activities in general
practice, following implementation of a preventive
care intervention
2. To investigate the impact of removing external audit
plus feedback on preventive care activities in general
practice, following implementation of a preventive
care intervention
3. To evaluate the views and acceptability of financial
incentive payments and external audit plus feedback
among GPs and other clinic staff
4. To conduct a cost-consequence analysis (a form
of economic analysis that compares alternative
interventions) comparing scenarios for continuation/
discontinuation of financial incentive payments and
external audit plus feedback activities
Methods
Setting for ACCEPt-able
ACCEPt-able builds on the ACCEPt RCT conducted in
Australian general practice. ACCEPt evaluated whether a
multifaceted intervention could increase chlamydia testing
and reduce the prevalence of chlamydia among sexually
active 16- to 29-year-old men and women attending gen-
eral practice. Chlamydia is the most common bacterial
sexually transmitted infection (STI) worldwide with over
100 million men and women infected at any point in time
[21]. Annual chlamydia screening among under 30-year-
old adults is a key preventive care activity [18].
Design of ACCEPt
ACCEPt was evaluated using a cluster RCT design
(Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Register,
ACTRN12610000297022) [22]. An intervention to sup-
port increased chlamydia testing was allocated at the geo-
graphical area (postcode) level in four Australian states
(New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South
Australia) and all general practices in each postcode par-
ticipated. GPs in the intervention group were asked to
offer an annual chlamydia test to all sexually active 16- to
29-year-old patients, and they received a multifaceted
support package designed to facilitate chlamydia testing.
Each practice in the intervention group received the fol-
lowing: (i) financial incentive payments to the GP for each
chlamydia test conducted. These payments ranged from
$AU 5 per eligible test for up to 20 % coverage to $AU 8
per test for over 40 % coverage. These payments were re-
imbursed to the GP every 3 months. The amount of these
payments was based on similar incentives available to GPs
for immunisations in Australia at the time the trial com-
menced in 2010. (ii) Audit and feedback by provision of
quarterly chlamydia testing reports for each GP and the
general practice. The report listed the number of patients
aged 16 to 29 years that the GP tested during the quarter,
his/her chlamydia testing rate (numerator = total number
of chlamydia tests done for 16- to 29-year-olds; denomin-
ator = total number of patients aged 16 to 29 years seen at
least once for a consultation during the time period) for
the quarter and for the previous 12 months. The feedback
reports were provided in person every 3 months by a re-
search officer. Further detail can be found in the ACCEPt
protocol [22].
ACCEPt was completed in December 2015 with a total
of 125 general practices (63 intervention and 62 control)
participating. Annual testing rates in the intervention
group increased from 8.1 % in the year prior to the
trial to 19.8 % in the final year of the trial. Two gen-
eral practices withdrew from ACCEPt; both were in
the control group.
Design of ACCEPt-able
ACCEPt-able is a factorial cluster RCT (Australian
and New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry ACTRN
1261400059617) with the general practice being the
unit of randomisation. An RCT has a factorial design
when two or more experimental interventions are
not only evaluated separately but also in combin-
ation and against a control [23]. The strength of this
design is that it provides more information than par-
allel designs. Our intervention is allocated at the
cluster level (general practice) because patients at-
tending each practice can consult with multiple dif-
ferent GPs over time but they are only eligible for
one chlamydia test each year unless they report add-
itional risk factors for infection (e.g. recent change
in sex partner) or genital symptoms requiring further
chlamydia testing.
Practices were recruited into ACCEPt-able when their
participation in ACCEPt was completed. A research offi-
cer explained the trial to the GPs and once the GPs con-
sented to participate, the practices were randomised to
one of four groups. (Fig. 1).
Duration
The duration of the intervention period for ACCEPt-
able will be up to 2 years. Recruitment commenced in
September 2014 and was completed in September 2015.
The trial is due to be completed in late 2017.
Inclusion criteria
To be eligible to participate in ACCEPt-able, general
practices must have been participating in ACCEPt,
have been in the intervention group and they must
have GRHANITE™, a data extraction tool (see below
for further information) installed on their medical re-
cords software.
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Intervention
General practices participating in ACCEPt-able were re-
randomised into one of the following four trial groups:
1) Removal of audit and feedback—continue incentive
payments only (group 1): GPs and general practices
in this group continue to receive incentive payments
for each test conducted as described above.
2) Removal of financial incentive payments—continue
audit plus feedback only (group 2): each GP
will continue to receive a report outlining their
chlamydia testing performance over the last quarter
as described above.
3) Removal of financial incentive payments and audit
plus feedback (group 3): GPs and general practice
staff will not receive any feedback or incentive
payments for chlamydia tests undertaken during
the trial.
4) Continue financial incentive payments and audit
plus feedback (group 4): GPs and general practices
will continue to receive both quarterly feedback and
quarterly incentive payments for all chlamydia tests
done for eligible patients.
Randomisation, allocation concealment and blinding
The unit of randomisation (cluster) is the general prac-
tice, and these have been randomised using a minimisa-
tion approach that maximises the balance across two
baseline variables. These baseline variables are annual
chlamydia testing rates among 16- to 29-year-old men
and women for the 12-month period prior to commen-
cing ACCEPt-able and size of the practice (number of
patients seen each year). Practices have been progres-
sively randomised into ACCEPt-able once their partici-
pation in ACCEPt is complete. The trial statistician is
located at a site away from any of the participating
general practices. The statistician allocated each general
practice according to the computer-generated algorithm
and informed research staff of the randomisation out-
come for each practice. Blinding of general practices and
GPs to their trial allocation is not possible given the
nature of the intervention.
Outcomes
The primary outcome is the annual chlamydia testing
rate measured as the proportion of 16- to 29-year-olds
consulting the general practice for any reason who have
at least one chlamydia test in a 12-month period. The
numerator is the number of people aged 16 to 29 years
who have at least one chlamydia test within a 12-month
period; the denominator is the number of people aged
16 to 29 years who have at least one GP consultation
during the same 12-month period.
Data collection
We have installed GRHANITE™ [24], a data extraction
tool developed by the University of Melbourne, at all gen-
eral practices participating in ACCEPt-able. The tool ex-
tracts anonymous data about all consultations including
age and gender of the patient, a unique non-identifying
patient code that enables us to track repeat visits to any
participating general practice, chlamydia pathology test
ordering, and test results. GRHANITE™ encrypts data on
the general practice computer and electronically exports
them to a secure database at the University of Melbourne
once per week. These data are used to calculate chlamydia
testing rates for participating GPs. In addition, we collect
data for factors that might confound associations with
our outcome of chlamydia testing rates. These data
include the individual’s age and gender and GP’s years
of experience in general practice, as well as area level
data such as the size of the underlying population
Fig. 1 ACCEPt-able flow chart
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and the socioeconomic profile of the area according
to the Australian Bureau of Statistics Index of Rela-
tive Disadvantage.
Sample size
The intra-cluster correlation for chlamydia testing in
participating general practices in the 12 months prior to
commencing ACCEPt-able was 0.02. The cluster size of
an average of 700 patients aged 16 to 29 years seen in
each participating general practice per year gives a de-
sign effect of 15. With 60 general practices available
for randomisation and an average of 700 patients per
practice, we get an effective sample size of 2800 (calcu-
lated by dividing total patients by design effect = 60 ×
700 = 42,000; 42,000/15 = 2800). A sample size of 2800
patients across all four study groups will allow us to
detect a 5 % decrease in testing from 20 to 15 % be-
tween any two groups with 94 % power. A total of 15
general practices will be randomly allocated to each of
the four study arms.
Statistical analysis
Analyses will be according to intention to treat. The ef-
fect of removal of incentives and removal of feedback on
chlamydia testing rates will be investigated by comparing
the study groups as shown in the table below (Table 1).
We will also investigate the effect of each of the two in-
terventions on chlamydia testing rates as main effects
exploiting the factorial nature of the design. Thus, the
effect of removing financial incentives will be assessed
by comparing randomised groups 2 and 3 with groups 1
and 4. Similarly, the effect of removing audit plus feed-
back will be assessed by comparing groups 1 and 3 with
groups 2 and 4. The advantage of a factorial design is
that it includes all patients in assessing the effectiveness
of the two separate interventions, maximising the power
of the study. However, this is based on the assumption
that the effect of the two interventions is at least addi-
tive, and that there is no negative interaction between
them, which will be tested. Formal statistical compari-
sons will be based on generalised mixed models that
can account for cluster (general practice), GP and pa-
tient variability. Generalised estimating equation (GEE)
approaches, with robust standard errors, will be adopted
using STATA software. Hierarchical logistic regression
models will be used to examine the impact of each of
the two interventions over time on the proportion of
patients who have a chlamydia test during the follow-
up. Analyses will be adjusted for the chlamydia test-
ing rate at each general practice immediately prior to
commencing ACCEPt-able.
Interviews with GPs and general practice staff
To evaluate the views and acceptability of incentive pay-
ments and external audit plus feedback, we will conduct
semi-structured qualitative interviews with a sample of
about 28 GPs (7 from each study arm) and 20 other staff
including nurses and practice managers (5 from each
study arm) towards the end of the ACCEPt-able inter-
vention period. Recruitment numbers will be dependent
upon reaching saturation of themes arising from itera-
tive data analysis. All interviews will be conducted by
telephone. Participants will be reimbursed for each inter-
view ($AU 100 for GPs; $AU 40 for practice nurses/
managers). The use of different sources of information
(GPs, nurses, practice managers) is consistent with best
practice in qualitative research (i.e. “triangulation”
methods). The interview will cover (i) views and accept-
ability of audit plus feedback and incentive payments
and their removal; (ii) perceived facilitators and barriers
to preventive care activities; (iii) impacts of the trial on
the general practice; and (iv) any contextual factors
that may impact on the general practice’s workload and
patient mix. Interviews will be tape-recorded and tran-
scribed verbatim. After multiple readings of the text,
data will be coded utilising a qualitative data software
package. Consensus on main themes and sub-themes
will be reached by multiple coders assigned to each
transcription. Analyses will explore the acceptability of
financial incentives and audit plus feedback and iden-
tify any barriers and facilitators to chlamydia testing in
general practice.
Cost-consequence evaluation
A cost-consequence analysis comparing costs and conse-
quences in the scenarios for continuation/discontinuation
Table 1 Comparison of groups for analysis
Comparison Removal of audit and
feedback—continue
financial incentives only
Removal of financial
incentives—continue
audit plus feedback only
Removal of financial
incentives and audit
plus feedback
Continue financial
incentives and audit
plus feedback
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Removal of financial
incentives versus other
Groups 2 and 3 versus groups 1 and 4
Removal of audit and
feedback versus other
Groups 1 and 3 versus groups 2 and 4
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of financial incentives and audit plus feedback activ-
ities will be undertaken. Costs (including incentives,
travel, time) and consequences in the following sce-
narios will be compared: (i) financial incentives con-
tinue but audit plus feedback activities are removed;
(ii) financial incentives are removed but audit plus
feedback activities continue; (iii) both financial incen-
tives and audit plus feedback activities are removed;
and (iv) financial incentives and audit plus feedback
activities continue. The consequence to be considered
in each scenario is the proportion of people tested in
the target population.
Trial status
The trial has been registered on the Australian and New
Zealand Clinical Trials Registry (ACTRN12614000595617).
A total of 59 general practices have been recruited to
ACCEPt-able with only one eligible practice refusing to
participate (98 % response rate). The intervention period
will be complete on 2017 with trial results due late 2017.
Discussion
This will be the first RCT to examine the impact of
removal of financial incentive payments and audit and
feedback on the chlamydia testing behaviour of GPs. As
both the Australian and UK governments act to reduce
payments or raise the threshold to be eligible for pay-
ments, we urgently need robust epidemiological data
assessing the potential impact this might have on pro-
vider performance and patient outcomes. Further, audit
plus feedback are key components of managing quality
improvement in general practice in Australia and the
UK [4, 5], and while research suggests that it can be
effective in modifying provider behaviour [6], there is no
RCT evidence available about the impact its removal
may have on GP activity.
The interactions between intrinsic motivation of
doctors and extrinsic rewards such as financial remu-
neration are complex. It is difficult to judge the point
at which incentivized behaviours become normalised
within standard practice, rendering financial incen-
tives superfluous. A recently published study exam-
ined the impact of removing financial incentives on
provider behaviour in the Kaiser Permanente health
plan in the USA. This observational study found that
when financial incentives were removed from two in-
dicators, there was a small decrease of about 3 % per
year for screening for diabetic retinopathy and 1.6 %
per year for cervical cancer screening [13]. A more
recent analysis of observational data examined the ef-
fect of withdrawing incentives for eight clinical quality
indicators from the QOF in the UK including influ-
enza immunisation, lithium treatment and blood pres-
sure, cholesterol and blood glucose monitoring. This
study found that mean levels of performance were gener-
ally stable, in both the short and long term; however, there
was a small but statistically significant drop in influenza
immunisations [25].
This trial has several strengths. Firstly, a factorial RCT
design is the most powerful and efficient method to in-
vestigate the impact of removing financial incentives and
audit plus feedback on GP behaviour. In addition to the
effects of each treatment, factorial design provides some
data on the interaction that may exist between two inter-
ventions. Hence, we will have evidence about whether
the effect of the removal of incentives varies according
to whether or not practices receive audit plus feedback
as well. Secondly, the inclusion of qualitative interviews
will collect valuable data about the perceived importance
of incentive payments and audit and feedback to general
practice staff. These qualitative data will be assessed
alongside the trial results, providing greater insight to
the RCT results. Finally, the cost-consequence analysis
also strengthens this trial. This trial will gather evidence
to inform future policy on primary care reform, and as
part of this, the cost of the interventions investigated
and the outcomes associated with each intervention are
of paramount importance to decision makers. A cost-
consequence analysis involves itemising the different
intervention components and their costs and the out-
comes (chlamydia testing rate) for each trial group. We
have selected this form of analysis because, unlike a
cost-effectiveness analysis, the cost-consequence ap-
proach clearly lists the costs and outcomes associated
with each intervention enabling decision makers to see
the actual data. Unfortunately, one clinic refused to par-
ticipate in the trial. However, this has negligible impact
on our statistical power as we will still have 93 % power
to detect a drop in chlamydia testing rates from 20 to
15 % between any two groups.
Conclusion
While annual chlamydia screening is a key preventive
health activity for young adults in Australia and the UK
[18, 20], the results of this trial will have preventive
health implications well beyond the content area of chla-
mydia. Incentive payments and audit plus feedback are
already used for several preventive health activities in
primary care in Australia and the UK including asthma
management, cervical cancer screening and cardiovascu-
lar risk assessment. Our results will be readily transfer-
able to these other preventive health activities. This trial
is particularly timely as we will increase the understand-
ing of the impact of financial incentives and audit and
feedback on primary care provider behaviour when
governments are looking for opportunities to control
healthcare budgets and maximise clinical outcomes for
money spent.
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